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This article looks at the first two local jihads in Indonesia after the fall of President Suharto: 
the 1999-2005 Ambon jihad and the 2000-07 Poso jihad. Both jihads were launched by 
Javanese mujahidin in response to the eruption of Christian-Muslim communal violence. The 
Ambon jihad was characterized by disagreement, infighting and lack of strategic direction, 
while the Poso jihad was comparatively better led and linked to the broader goals of 
establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia. This article explores the differences between the two 
jihads and asks to what extent the better organization of the Poso jihad was the result of lessons 
learnt from the “mistakes” of the Ambon jihad. The article advances two arguments. First, the 
Ambon jihad was undermined by the lengthy debate within Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) on how to 
respond to the Ambon conflict as well as by the shifting dynamics between JI, Mujahidin 
KOMPAK and Laskar Jihad. Second, that the Poso jihad was more organized than the Ambon 
one because JI’s leadership had a more comprehensive approach to the Poso jihad; because 
JI and Mujahidin KOMPAK had learnt from the mistakes of the Ambon jihad in the areas of 
leadership, training, and using local jihads to achieve national aims; and because the intra- 
and inter-mujahidin dynamics and with it the “state of jihad” had evolved between February 
1999 and September 2000.  
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On 24 December 1998, an argument between a Muslim and a Christian youth over a 
screwdriver followed by the stabbing of a Muslim youth by a Christian later that evening 
triggered communal conflict in Poso, Central Sulawesi.1 Three weeks later, on 19 January 
1999, a dispute between two Muslim youths and a Christian city transport driver over a bus 
fare ignited communal conflict in Ambon, Maluku.2 Both conflicts were rooted in socio-
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economic and political competition between Christians and Muslims. In both areas, local 
power-sharing arrangements had been undermined by three decades of President Suharto’s 
centralization and migration policies. Both conflicts resulted in a lacklustre response from the 
Indonesian government as the communal violence on the periphery of the archipelago was 
deemed to be less urgent than the political struggles that were taking place in Jakarta following 
the fall of Suharto’s New Order regime in May 1998. This provided an opening for jihadi 
volunteers from other parts of Indonesia, and gave rise to the Ambon and Poso jihads. 
The Ambon and Poso jihads only partially overlapped with the Ambon and Poso 
conflicts. The Ambon jihad began after the first wave of violence in January 1999, during 
which Ambonese Christians had targeted Muslim migrants, destroying their market stalls, 
burning their houses and driving them out of Ambon. The Poso jihad started after the 
Walisongo massacre in May 2000 in which Muslim students and teachers from the Walisongo 
pesantren (Islamic boarding school), as well as Muslim migrants from the adjacent village, 
were hacked to death by Christians. Both jihads continued beyond the end of the communal 
conflicts in Poso in December 2001 and in Ambon in February 2002. The Ambon jihad waned 
after an attack on a police post in Loki on Seram island in 2005, while the Poso jihad 
temporarily ceased with a mujahidin-police shootout in Poso city’s Tanah Runtuh 
neighbourhood in 2007. 3 Both areas remain home to small extremist cells to this day. 
This article examines the Ambon and Poso jihads from a comparative and evolutionary 
perspective. At the heart of this analysis are two interconnected questions: Why was the Ambon 
jihad so much more disorganized than the Poso jihad? And to what extent was the better 
organization of the Poso jihad the result of lessons learnt from the “mistakes” of the Ambon 
jihad? This article argues that the Ambon jihad was undermined by disagreements within one 
of the main jihadi organizations, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), as well as by the shifting dynamics 
between JI and the other key jihadi groups, Mujahidin KOMPAK4 and Laskar Jihad. This 
article further posits that the Poso jihad was more organized than the Ambon jihad because JI’s 
leadership had a different, more comprehensive, approach to the Poso jihad; because JI and 
Mujahidin KOMPAK had learnt from some of the mistakes of the Ambon jihad in the areas of 
leadership, training and using local jihads to achieve national aims; and because the intra- and 
inter-mujahidin dynamics, and with it the “state of jihad”, had evolved between February 1999 
and September 2000.  
The Ambon and Poso jihads have not been examined in much detail in the academic 
literature on the violence during the post-Suharto democratic transition. This literature, as 
exemplified by writings of  Jacques Bertrand, Gerry Van Klinken, Yukhi Tajima and Harold 
Crouch5 has instead focused on the communal conflicts. It has examined the root causes of the 
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violence, its links to the authoritarian policies of the New Order, the violence as an assertion 
of identity, and as an expression of the struggle over local resources as well as political power. 
Jihad in Ambon and Poso was only one element within the broader analysis of the conflicts, 
and more often than not, it was equated with Laskar Jihad as the most visible of the jihadi 
groups. The Ambon and Poso jihads have also been a side story in the literature on Islamist 
resurgence and jihad in Indonesia. John Sidel and Noorhaidi Hasan have referenced Ambon 
and Poso in their discussion of Laskar Jihad within the rise of militant Islamism in post-Suharto 
Indonesia.6 In their books on JI, Zachary Abuza, Greg Barton, Maria Ressa and Ken Conboy 
mention Ambon and Poso, but their overall focus is on JI’s links with Al-Qaeda, JI’s ideology 
and above all its violence and the threat it poses to Indonesia and Southeast Asia.7 The notable 
exceptions are Solahudin  and Sidney Jones, who have examined the role of the Ambon and 
Poso jihads in the evolution of JI as well as mujahidin and jihadi activities in Ambon and Poso, 
and Greg Fealy and Chernov Hwang who have looked at local jihad in Indonesia and mujahidin 
disengagement.8 More coverage of these two jihads can be found in the small number of books 
and articles specifically on the Ambon and Poso conflicts. Writing on Ambon Bertrand, Dieter 
Bartels, Jeroen  Adam, Badrus Sholeh and Sumanto Al-Qurtuby have examined the causes of 
conflict, the mobilization of society, the role of religion and efforts to resolve the conflict in 
Ambon.9 Loraine Aragon, Rinaldy Damanik and Dave McRae have done the same with respect 
to Poso.10 Aspects of jihadism in these conflicts have been explored by Kirsten E. Schulze and 
Birgit Bräuchler who examined Laskar Jihad in the Ambon conflict,11 and McRae and Tito 
Karnavian as well as Julie Chernov Hwang, Rizal Panggabean and Ihsan Fauzi who have 
looked at the role of the Javanese mujahidin in the Poso conflict, their affiliates Mujahidin 
Kayamanya and Mujahidin Tanah Runtuh, counter-terrorism efforts and jihadi 
disengagement.12 The Ambon and Poso jihads have also featured in the detailed reports 
published by the International Crisis Group and the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict.13 
It is to this latter, more detailed, literature on the Ambon and Poso jihads that this article seeks 
to contribute. 
Drawing upon a wide range of interviews conducted by the author between 1999 and 
2018, this article starts by exploring the debate within JI after the Ambon conflict erupted in 
January 1999. It then proceeds to examine the role that the Muslim humanitarian aid 
organisation KOMPAK played during this early period in Ambon from January 1999 to mid-
2000, as a gateway to jihad. This is followed by an analysis of how and why the Poso jihad 
differed from the Ambon jihad, what lessons were learned from the “mistakes” of the Ambon 
jihad, and whether these lessons explain why the Poso jihad was so much better organized than 
the Ambon jihad. The article concludes with a discussion of the evolutionary aspects, looking 
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at how intra- and inter-mujahidin dynamics evolved from the Ambon jihad to the Poso jihad.
  
 
The Debate in JI on Ambon 
The eruption of conflict between Christians and Muslims in Ambon in January 1999 became 
the first big challenge for JI in Indonesia. JI was founded in 1993 by Indonesian clerics 
Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir while in exile in Malaysia. Headed by an amir— 
Sungkar until his death in November 1999 followed by Ba’asyir—and governed by a qiyadah 
markaziyah (Central Council), the organization was divided into four mantiqi (territorial 
divisions) across Southeast Asia: Mantiqi 1 covered Singapore and Malaysia; Mantiqi 2 
encompassed Indonesia including Ambon but excluding Poso; Mantiqi 3 comprised the 
Southern Philippines, Sabah, Sarawak and Sulawesi including Poso; and Mantiqi 4, also 
referred to as Mantiqi Ukhro (the last mantiqi), covered Papua and Australia.14 JI’s ultimate 
aim was to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. At the time of the first wave of violence in 
Ambon, JI’s leaders and many of its members had only just returned to Indonesia after the fall 
of Suharto in May 1998, and JI was still trying to find its feet on Indonesian soil. 
The debate within JI on Ambon revolved around the nature of the conflict, whether JI 
should get involved and if so what JI’s response should look like. Heated discussions were held 
both at the leadership level within JI’s markaziyah and among its members for over a year. At 
different stages of this debate, the fault-line ran between Indonesians and Malaysians within 
JI, between Mantiqi 2 and the other mantiqis, and between JI’s veterans of military training 
along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border in the period 1985-94 known as the “Afghan alumni” 
and the rest of JI. 
Most Indonesian JI members regarded the Ambon conflict with considerable suspicion. 
Like other Indonesians at the time, many believed that the violence was a “dirty game” which 
had originated in Jakarta, in the circle of former President Suharto, and possibly engineered by 
the Indonesian military which had been pushed out of power. As Bali bomber Ali Imron 
recalled, there were two key questions that were being discussed: “What are they fighting 
about? And will this help or hinder us in our aim to establish an Islamic state?”15  
In order to answer the first question, Sungkar asked JI’s head of military operations, 
Zulkarnaen, to send an investigative team to Ambon. Zulkarnaen, an Afghan alumnus, had 
formed a special team known as Laskar Khos in 1998, mostly drawing upon other Afghan 
alumni. Ali Imron, who was part of Laskar Khos, became part of this initial JI investigative 
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effort along with twin brothers Nurudin and Saifuddin, just after the first wave of violence had 
ended in February 1999: 
 
We went there and talked to Muslim leaders, but not known ones and not politicians 
because we did not know who we could trust. They said they were attacked by the 
Christians and that they wanted to defend themselves. From what I saw, and the stories 
I heard, I got the impression that they needed lessons to prepare themselves —just some 
basic lessons on how to use a gun and how to make bombs, but the most important was 
fiqh jihad.16 
 
Ali Imron only stayed in Ambon for three weeks. As he departed for the Philippines, Nurudin 
and Saifuddin stayed behind and started to teach fiqh jihad to some Ambonese Muslims.17 They 
also provided them with rudimentary training—such as handling firearms and bomb making—
to prepare them for any further violence.18 
At the same time, Sungkar also sought out Osama bin Laden’s opinion on Ambon 
through Mukhlas, who led Mantiqi 1 together with Hambali and who was travelling to 
Afghanistan: “Bin Laden’s reply was that to protect Islamic interests JI should take action.”19 
Together with the information gathered by JI’s investigative team, this convinced the Afghan 
alumni that JI had to help the Muslims in Ambon defend themselves. In a subsequent JI 
markaziyah meeting in Malaysia, at which neither Mantiqi 2 nor Mantiqi 3 leaders were 
present, the decision was made to put Zulkarnaen in charge of JI’s Ambon response and to send 
both Zulkarnaen and Mantiqi 1 leader Hambali to Maluku.20 This did not, however, end the 
debate within JI. In fact, it exacerbated it as Ambon was in the territory of Mantiqi 2. Indeed, 
according to Abu Rusydan, who was an influential leader in Mantiqi 2 and a JI markaziyah 
member, it was “after that [decision that] JI splintered”.21  
The fractures within JI came to the fore at a meeting Zulkarnaen organized in June 1999 
in Solo attended by some 20 JI members “representing Solo, Lamongan, Central Java, East 
Java, Manado, and Jakarta”,22 including Laskar Khos members Zuhroni, Asep Darwin, Abdul 
Ghoni (alias Umaer), Sawad (alias Sarjiyo), Ali Imron and Mubarok.23 Heated debate took 
place at this meeting, with Mantiqi 1 members and Afghan alumni arguing that according to 
JI’s General Guidelines for the Struggle of JI (known as PUPJI), “JI was obligated to struggle 
in Ambon as it was clearly a jihad difai (defensive jihad).” 24 The head of Mantiqi 2, Abu Fatih, 
“was reportedly lambasted by several of those present…for being too slow and bureaucratic”.25 
On a different occasion, Sungkar, during a visit to Jakarta, “confronted senior Mantiqi 2 leader 
Achmad Roichan about why they were taking so long to act” and “Roichan responded that JI 
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was not yet ready, that it needed to do more education and training to build up its social base 
before engaging in jihad.”26 Mantiqi 2 leaders had no intention of getting involved in the 
Ambon conflict despite the fact that Ambon was in their territory.27 They had sent their own 
investigative team which had concluded that this was not a religious conflict.28 Therefore they 
did not see this as a jihad sah (true jihad).29 They supported sending humanitarian aid but not 
fighters. Ultimately, they were unconvinced that the time was right for JI to embark on jihad 
in Indonesia as JI was clearly “still in the i’dad (preparation) phase”.30 
As a result, JI’s Afghan alumni—a free-floating group outside the hierarchical 
structure—rather than Mantiqi 2 became the driving force and key players in the Ambon 
conflict. At that June meeting in Solo, Zulkarnaen assigned tasks to his subordinates, such as 
looking for weapons and explosives, recruiting people and preparing military training in 
Maluku.31 However, by this point some Afghan alumni, who were impatient with the debate in 
JI, such as Jibril, had already gone on their own initiative.32 As Jibril explained: 
 
When we went to Ambon it was not an official JI decision. Zulkarnaen said that this 
was a jihad but others didn’t agree. So it was a group of Afghan alumni who decided to 
go because our Muslim brothers were dying. Also as we had military experience from 
Afghanistan we had a responsibility to come to the defence of Muslims and to give 
guidance to the people.33  
 
Similarly, fellow Afghan alumnus Farihin went to Ambon as what he termed “non-structural 
personnel” as he “could not wait for all the bureaucracy in JI” and “because they [Muslims in 
Ambon] were being slaughtered like goats”.34 Farihin did not see “the need for agreement from 
Mantiqi 2”.35 In fact, he “didn’t need anyone’s permission because Ambon was fardu ayn (an 
individual obligation)”.36 Nevertheless, he also pointed out that “Abdullah Sungkar supported 
us going”, and that Sungkar had always said that “the strong had an obligation to help the weak, 
and that if Muslim blood is being spilled “you have to go and help them”.37  
Even after the markaziyah decision had been made, JI members continued to go on their 
own initiative—a testament to the fracturing Abu Rusydan referred to. Some of these JI 
members were “frustrated with Zulkarnaen”,38 while others were frustrated with Mantiqi 2. 
Indeed, Mantiqi 2 continued to forbid its members to go to Ambon despite the markaziyah 
decision in what the head of JI Mantiqi 3 at that time, Abu Tholut, labelled as “the revolt of 
Mantiqi 2”.39 The rift within JI deepened when Sungkar passed away in November 1999 and 
was succeeded by Abu Bakar Ba’syir who was a much more divisive figure and did not 
command the same respect as Sungkar. 
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Eventually, in mid-2000, almost a year and half after the conflict had erupted, Mantiqi 
2 permitted its members to depart for Ambon. This, according to Abu Tholut, was not because 
“they changed their mind about the nature of the jihad there, but because they were under a lot 
of pressure from their own members”: 
 
Everyone was sending volunteers to Ambon and people were asking questions why JI 
was not. The leadership of Mantiqi 2 had to answer a lot of questions. Mantiqi 2 was 
asked: you are jihadis, what is up with Ambon? Muslims from all parts of Indonesia 
and even foreign Muslims are going to Ambon, where are you? Muslims outside JI 
were sending people to Ambon—like Laskar Jihad. So JI members asked where are our 
leaders in this? Why are they silent? Mantiqi 2 members were confused. And in the end 
the Mantiqi 2 leaders agreed.40 
 
The heated and at times acrimonious debate within JI during the first two years of the Ambon 
conflict undermined the Ambon jihad considerably. The divisions within the markaziyah, 
between the mantiqis, and between the Afghan alumni and the rest, damaged the credibility of 
the JI leadership at this crucial point of JI’s first big challenge in Indonesia. It created 
uncertainties and a loss of confidence among JI members to the extent that hierarchies and 
command structures were by-passed as numerous JI members made their own way to Ambon. 
This individualistic and unstructured response of JI in turn made a well-organized jihad 
virtually impossible.  
 
KOMPAK: Gateway to Jihad in Ambon 
While the debate over Ambon paralysed and fractured JI, this was not the case for KOMPAK 
(Komite Aksi Penanggulangan Akibat Krisis, the Action Committee for Tackling the 
Consequences of the Crisis) which had a humanitarian brief. KOMPAK was established in 
1997 by Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (DDII) during the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis 
which had hit Indonesia hard. Its main aim at that point was to help ordinary Muslims by 
sending sembako (staple foods) to various areas that were suffering from the effects of the 
economic crisis.41 When the Ambon conflict erupted, KOMPAK’s Solo branch, headed by Aris 
Munandar, was contacted by Ali Fawzi who was the head of DDII’s Ambon branch. He asked 
KOMPAK to provide humanitarian aid —“sembako, clothes and tents for the displaced”. 42 
KOMPAK responded quickly, becoming the first humanitarian organization to go to Ambon. 
Its volunteers brought the requested aid, documented the violence against Muslims and 
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produced videos and video compact discs (VCDs) which helped raise awareness of the Muslim 
plight in Ambon and were instrumental in the recruitment of further volunteers. KOMPAK 
also sent doctors to Ambon’s Al-Fatah hospital, including Aris Munandar’s wife.43 
In Ambon city, KOMPAK set up an office in Waihaong as well as a clinic, both in the 
same building.44 It was through this office that aid to Ambon’s Muslims, and those on 
neighbouring islands, was channelled, including aid from Indonesian organizations such as the 
Medical Emergency Rescue Committee (Mer-C) and the Hidayatullah pesantren network.45 
According to Abdullah Sunata, who headed the Waihaong office in 2000-01: 
 
We were organizing the incoming humanitarian aid. It was very uncoordinated in the 
beginning. This was important especially for the smaller organizations. For instance, 
Hidayatullah sent aid from Balikpapan. They asked us for help. So we organized the 
shipping of the aid to Ambon and they took over from there.46 
 
KOMPAK also assisted foreign Muslim charities such as the Saudi al-Haramain Islamic 
Foundation, which “came with their own people who distributed the aid and then returned”.47 
The distribution of all this aid, however, was often hindered by the violence on the ground. As 
Aris Munandar explained: 
 
We distributed this aid across the islands and for that we had to bypass Christian areas. 
But the volunteers were not brave enough. Our primary mission became difficult to 
implement. We needed to defend our provision  and distribution of aid. So KOMPAK 
decided to work together with the Javanese mujahidin to facilitate the passage of aid. 
This is how KOMPAK got involved in the conflict.48 
 
The Javanese mujahidin in question were the Afghan alumni of JI, and the working relationship 
between them was an organic one as Aris Munandar himself was an Afghan alumnus and a 
member of JI.49 KOMPAK thus became the primary conduit for many JI members to go to 
Ambon not only “because JI did not have a framework for Ambon activities”50 but also because 
it was safe as “KOMPAK was also JI.”51 KOMPAK’s cooperation with the mujahidin did not 
end there. According to Ali Imron, the Solo office “did the fundraising and sent it [the money] 
to Ambon to buy weapons and finance training”.52 He had met with Aris Munandar in Solo 
before heading to Ambon on his second visit: 
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When I returned to Ambon the second time, I brought Aris Munandar’s subordinates 
with me. I also went to find a place for a training camp that was near Ambon but not so 
close that the security forces would spot us. We found a place in Waimurat [Buru 
island]. The first people we trained were the KOMPAK members who had come with 
me. That’s when Mujahidin KOMPAK started, but we did not use that name then—
only later when JI and KOMPAK separated. So I became the one who established 
Mujahidin KOMPAK. I was sent by JI but we could not use the JI name.53 
 
The establishment of the Waimurat training camp was “the immediate result of the June 1999 
decision” at Zulkarnaen’s meeting in Solo.54 It was not only the first JI training camp on 
Indonesian soil, but it also became a key camp in facilitating the close social bonds of a new 
jihadi generation which outlasted the Ambon jihad and became the backbone of subsequent 
Indonesian involvement in other jihads such as Poso as well as Mindanao and Syria.55  
The first batch of what later became Mujahidin KOMPAK was trained at Waimurat. 
And while Ali Imron had been instrumental in arranging this, it was Aris Munandar who 
became “the driving force” behind turning KOMPAK into “an organisation for ‘freelance’ 
mujahidin from all over Indonesia, although most recruits were from Java and Sulawesi”.56 
Indeed, KOMPAK’s office in Waihaong became the contact and entry point for Javanese 
mujahidin from other organizations such as Darul Islam (DI), Negara Islam Indonesia (NII) 
and Laskar Jihad, as well as for mujahidin from Sulawesi “who were a mix of KOMPAK 
Selatan (KOMPAK South), Laskar Jundullah [the security wing of the Committee for the 
Preparation of Syariah in South Sulawesi] and Wahdah Islamiyah [a Makassar-based salafi 
organisation]”. 57 A small number of foreign mujahidin “mainly from Saudi Arabia but also 
Yemen, Syria, Jordan and Palestine”,58 some of whom had links to Al-Qaeda, also entered 
Ambon through the Waihaong office.59 Thus, as JI volunteer Jibril put it, KOMPAK became 
“the centre of the jihadi forces with an office which was modelled on Osama Bin Laden’s 
maktab al-khidmat [services office during the Soviet-Afghan mujahidin war], channelling both 
aid and mujahidin”.60 
The parallel with the maktab al-khidmat is instructive. It reveals the extent to which the 
Afghan jihad served as a blueprint in the minds of the Indonesian Afghan alumni. The 
establishment of a similar centralizing office in Ambon, moreover, demonstrates the ability to 
learn from previous jihadi experiences. The fact that it was KOMPAK rather than JI that 
established it shows how KOMPAK had some clear advantages as it was a legitimate, above 
ground humanitarian aid organization. But it also reflects the fact that KOMPAK was able to 
play this role as it was not hostage to the debate and divisions within JI. At the same time, it 
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should be pointed out that KOMPAK’s organizational role was limited to distributing aid, 
allocating bases to incoming jihadi groups and later providing military training. It did not, as 
will be seen in this article, extend to the battlefield.   
During the first year of the Ambon conflict, only JI members and KOMPAK members 
went to Ambon through KOMPAK. KOMPAK volunteer Jek Harun, who was one of the first 
to arrive in Ambon, recalled that KOMPAK: 
 
…immediately responded in Solo when the conflict erupted. We had a meeting, 
organized volunteers and gathered aid. The situation on the ground was bad. The houses 
were all burnt down in the attacks. So we decided to help with the rebuilding of the 
houses.61 
 
Jek Harun became one of the coordinators who organized people going to Ambon: 
 
The first group we sent had about ten persons. They were seniors [high-ranking jihadis] 
who went there to check out the situation. We videoed it to show it to the Muslims in 
Java to explain the situation. We explained that the victimhood was both physical and 
non-physical—and the non-physical was worse. They [Muslims in Ambon] lost the 
motivation to live. They asked us for help because we were their Muslim brothers. They 
were not brave enough so we needed to be brave for them. 62 
 
In December 1999, as another wave of violence swept through Ambon, KOMPAK opened its 
doors to volunteers from any background and “raised funds for them to go there”.63 It also used 
humanitarian aid missions as a recruitment tool as the story of Aput, a student at Trisakti 
University in Jakarta, demonstrates. Aput was studying transport management at the time. His 
path to jihad in Ambon started at meetings of the Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the 
Muslim World (KISDI).64 KISDI, which had raised awareness about the plight of Muslims in 
Palestine, Bosnia and Indian-occupied Kashmir during the Suharto era, now played a key role 
in raising awareness about the plight of Muslims in Ambon: 
 
KISDI distributed the VCDs [made by KOMPAK] on the violence in Ambon. We had 
discussions about the situation and I felt called to go to Ambon to help. I became a 
volunteer for DDII to deliver humanitarian aid. I signed up with KOMPAK to go to 
Ambon. That was the end of 1999 or beginning of 2000.65 
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Aput was tasked with delivering humanitarian aid: 
 
I went to Waihaong bringing with me medicines and food for KOMPAK. Then I went 
to distribute the humanitarian aid. People were in dire need of medicine and in some 
areas the Muslims were starving. I was sent to deliver aid to Seram [a large island next 
to Ambon island] … On the way we were shot at and I felt scared. When we arrived in 
Seram there was a five-year old child who had just been found killed.66 
 
When Aput returned to the KOMPAK office in Waihaong after delivering the aid to Seram, 
Abdullah Sunata, who had become the head of the office in early 2000,67 “asked us whether 
we wanted to return to Java as our mission was completed or whether we would like to join the 
military training and help defend the Muslims”.68 Aput decided to join the military training. 
A similar experience also prompted a young Javanese KOMPAK volunteer calling 
himself “Abu Sayyaf” to join the military training. Abu Sayyaf had already joined KOMPAK 
during the financial crisis and had been a humanitarian aid volunteer ever since. After the 
Ambon conflict erupted, he decided to help his fellow Muslims there as well: 
 
When I first came to Ambon, there was an incident where I was part of an aid convoy. 
We had a Brimob [mobile police] escort and then we were attacked by Christians and 
our Brimob escort just fled. That was when we took the decision to arm ourselves. 
During that attack two volunteers were killed and two were wounded, including one 
Brimob.69 
 
KOMPAK also became the gateway for the last of the Javanese mujahidin organizations to 
enter Ambon—Laskar Jihad—a salafi organization which was established in January 2000, 
specifically in response to the government’s inability to protect Ambon’s Muslims as the 
conflict entered its second year. 70 Laskar Jihad entered Ambon through KOMPAK in April 
2000. As KOMPAK volunteer Ramly recalls:  
 
The first Laskar Jihad delegation of seven was met by Abdullah Sunata. They came to 
the KOMPAK office in Waihaong. They wanted an area. As they had doctors, and 
Galunggung had a hospital, we gave them Galunggung. We also gave them a base in 
Kebun Cengkeh.71 
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Once Laskar Jihad had been allocated territory, its volunteers stopped going through 
KOMPAK, hinting at a rift that would open between Laskar Jihad and the rest of the Javanese 
mujahidin several months later and which would become yet another factor of anarchy in the 
Ambon jihad, as will be seen in the final section of this article. 
 
The Poso Jihad and “Correcting” the “Mistakes” made in Ambon 
In the second year of the Ambon jihad, another local Indonesian jihad front opened up in Poso. 
The Poso jihad came in response to the Walisongo massacre on 28 May 2000, when Christians 
attacked the Walisongo pesantren outside Poso city as well as the neighbouring village 
Sintuwulemba. Approximately 100 Muslims were killed, including 38 who had sought 
sanctuary in the pesantren’s mosque. A six-man team of Mujahidin KOMPAK, led by 
Abdullah Sunata, arrived in early June 2000 directly from Ambon “carrying Rp 17 million 
[US$1215] in cash and 14 guns”.72 As in Ambon, KOMPAK’s initial involvement came in the 
form of humanitarian aid, helping with the evacuation of bodies and providing community 
assistance, but also recording and documenting the violence that Christians had perpetrated 
against local Muslims.73 The Mujahidin KOMPAK team was followed by Ahmad Roichan, 
Muhammad Qital and Firmansyah from JI who established contact with Poso Muslim leader 
Haji Adnan Arsal, who had a pesantren in the Tanah Runtuh neighbourhood of Poso city. They 
offered him assistance and he accepted.74 Laskar Jihad did not arrive in Poso until after the 
Buyung Katedo massacre on 3 July 2001 in which 14 villagers were killed, 12 of whom were 
women and children who had been hacked to death with machetes while the imam was burnt 
alive in the village mosque.75  
The Ambon and Poso jihads became “linked” as many of the mujahidin—belonging to 
all three organizations—came directly from Ambon, had previous Ambon experience or had 
formed clear opinions about the shortcomings of the jihadi response to the eruption of violence 
in Ambon. The Poso jihad thus presented an opportunity to “correct” past mistakes as well as 
an opportunity for JI’s Mantiqi 3 to not only make its mark but to make it against Mantiqi 2. 
The Poso jihad benefitted from the more comprehensive approach adopted by Mantiqi 3 leaders 
Abu Tholut and Nasir Abas, who were intent on exercising better control over their own men 
as well as the locals.76 Due to the lessons JI and Mujahidin KOMPAK had learnt from the 
Ambon jihad, as well as the increased clarity in intra- and inter-mujahidin dynamics on the 
battlefield, the Poso jihad was more organized than the Ambon jihad. 
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The mistakes of the Ambon jihad that were corrected in the Poso jihad broadly covered 
three areas: leadership, training and using local jihads to further the aim of establishing an 
Islamic state in Indonesia. The first and the third pertained particularly to JI and thus show 
Mantiqi 3’s alternative approach, while the second, as will be seen, was a lesson learnt by both 
JI and Mujahidin KOMPAK. 
Leadership 
The first lesson learnt from the Ambon conflict was that a lack of clarity in leadership could 
seriously undermine jihadi efforts. JI’s Ambon jihad, as discussed earlier, suffered from the 
divisions within the markaziyah and between the different mantiqis. As a result, the Ambon 
jihad was dominated by the Afghan alumni who operated outside the JI hierarchy and also saw 
a considerable degree of individual decision-making and action. By the time JI embarked upon 
the Poso jihad around September 2000, Mantiqi 2 had permitted its members to go to Ambon. 
This brought Mantiqi 2 in line with the rest of JI. Thus going to Poso was not the subject of 
great internal debate within JI as a consensus on local jihad had already been reached. Indeed, 
an agreed narrative was now being advanced as exemplified by Abu Rusydan’s statement that 
“the main thing for JI with respect to the conflict in Ambon and Poso was the defence of the 
Muslims there. We were motivated to go there because we wanted to defend our brothers and 
defend our religion.”77 
Leadership, however, was not just an issue at the central level but also in the field. Here 
JI Mantiqi 3 leader Nasir Abas pointed to the failures of Zulkarnaen in Ambon as something 
that should be avoided in Poso:  
 
Zulkarnaen lost control over his men. That was a failure. Zulkarnaen was an instructor 
but not a leader. He was too strict. A leader needs to be a servant to his men. He needs 
to sit with them and laugh with them, just be together. But because of Zulkarnaen’s 
leadership, his men became so frustrated that they joined KOMPAK. Others did their 
own activities. So JI failed to get their message to the local people. If you can’t control 
your own men, how can you control the locals? 78 
 
The need to find a better link to the locals leads directly to the second lesson learnt from 
Ambon. 
Training 
The second lesson that JI and Mujahidin KOMPAK learnt from the Ambon conflict was that 
imbedding the training of local Muslims into a broader recruitment process produced better 
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quality local mujahidin. Jihadi training in Ambon and Poso comprised two core elements: the 
training of Javanese volunteers and the training of local volunteers. In the Ambon jihad, 
Javanese mujahidin were trained in semi-permanent camps such as the Waimurat camp, while 
locals were trained in mobile camps which were set up in response to where the need was the 
greatest, in or near the villages of the local Muslims to be trained. The training of Javanese 
mujahidin lasted three months on average,79 and included physical exercise, weapons training 
and religious instruction, particularly the teachings of Abdullah Azzam.80 The semi-permanent 
camps served a dual function. They prepared Javanese volunteers for fighting in Ambon and 
they provided “long term military training … for carrying out the obligation of i’dad”.81 The 
Ambon jihad was used both for recruitment as KOMPAK did and for “the caderization of the 
existing membership”,82 as JI did. New recruits into JI could undergo training in Ambon rather 
than go to the JI camps in the Philippines. The training of Javanese volunteers was thus firmly 
embedded in broader organizational processes. 
This was not the case for the training of local Muslims. The mobile training camps 
aimed at providing “short term military training … to anticipate violence in and around 
Ambon”. 83 The standard training session in these mobile camps lasted two weeks on average, 
with a minimum of five days. While religious instruction was part of the training, “the focus 
of the training programme was on defence”84 and on “survival skills”.85 As in Ambon, mobile 
camps and semi-permanent camps were also established in Poso. However, unlike in Ambon, 
both JI and Mujahidin KOMPAK moved quickly from mobile training camps for training locals 
to setting up semi-permanent camps in their bases in the Kayamanya and Tanah Runtuh 
neighbourhoods of Poso city.  
According to Nasir Abas, the training of local Muslims in Ambon was partially 
responsible for the disorganized nature of the Ambon jihad. Abas, who had been a trainer at 
JI’s Camp Hudaibiyah in the Philippines for many years, believed that the key mistake was that 
the training in Ambon focused too much on military expertise and was not sufficiently 
grounded in Islamic teachings and JI’s ideology.86 This resulted in Ambonese mujahidin 
trained by JI simply returning to their villages where they employed their new combat skills to 
defend their village but not necessarily to advance the Ambon jihad. While the content of the 
curriculum is significant, the fact that these Ambonese mujahidin were not recruited into an 
organization or included into a broader command structure led to JI’s and Mujahidin 
KOMPAK’s loss of control over the Ambonese they had trained almost as soon as they left the 
training camp. 
Both the curriculum and the organizational disconnect were corrected in the Poso jihad 
by embedding the training of local Muslims into a broader recruitment process of local 
15 
 
affiliates, Mujahidin Tanah Runtuh (JI) and Mujahidin Kayamanya (KOMPAK). This not only 
ensured that the military training was religiously and ideologically contextualized, but also that 
the newly trained had a place in a structured organization as well as a community to which they 
now belonged. Mujahidin Tanah Runtuh’s recruitment process, as recounted by several of its 
members, exemplifies this. This process started with public pengajian (Islamic studies 
sessions) in local mosques from which regular attendees were selected for pengajian khusus 
(special Islamic studies sessions). This was followed by tadrib (military training) which 
included “the study of strategy, tactics, warfare and force formation. How to shoot, camouflage, 
making bombs, and protecting yourself from the enemy.”87 It also included tafsir and fikh jihad. 
Tadrib was followed by more religious instruction through further pengajian khusus “going 
over the same religious material but more in-depth”, and then “more weapons training, 
including handling weapons like M16s, SS1s, SKSs, M3s and M4s”.88 After the second tadrib, 
the volunteers proceeded to the final stage of religious study—dauroh —where they focused 
on “jamaah (community), bai’at (loyalty oath) and khilafa (caliphate)”,89 before proceeding to 
the bai’at and full induction.90 This adapted version of the JI recruitment process enabled local 
mujahidin in Poso to defend their areas and to be better integrated into the Poso jihad, while 
ensuring that JI and Mujahidin KOMPAK, which had a similar but shorter recruitment process,  
had a greater degree of control over local mujahidin, and that Poso’s Muslims were far more 
tied into the broader Indonesian jihadi project than Muslims in Ambon. 
Using Local Jihads for National Aims 
The third lesson learnt from the Ambon jihad was that local jihads in Indonesia could and 
should be exploited for the longer-term aims of establishing an Islamic state by focusing on the 
local population. Ambon never occupied a significant place in JI’s Islamist imaginary, as JI 
saw Ambonese Muslims “as too heterodox and thus unlikely to be receptive to JI’s message of 
shari’a-isation”.91 Thus no programme was devised for Ambon, despite discussions within JI 
that the organization would “conduct territorial instruction with the aim of forming a branch 
that would in the future become part of Mantiqi Ukhro, based in Australia”,92 and despite 
individual JI members such as Ali Imron believing “that the Ambon conflict would be good 
place to recruit support for an Islamic state”.93 The Ambon jihad never became part of JI’s 
broader ideological plans. However, it did play a key role as the training ground for the next 
generation of Indonesian jihadis. 
The Poso jihad stands in stark contrast to the Ambon jihad. Muslims in Poso were 
believed to be “far more serious in their Islamic observances”94 and the area was seen as 
strategically important. Accordingly, JI devised a programme for Poso—known as Project 
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Uhud—which the head of Mantiqi 3, Abu Tholut, was put in charge of. The initial aim of Uhud 
was to help Muslims in Poso defend themselves. However, after the Malino 1 Peace Agreement 
in December 2001, the aim changed to establishing secure base in Poso, “which would precede 
the establishment of an Islamic state” in Indonesia.95 Poso thus became JI’s testing ground for 
the “much larger enterprise” of establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia, and the nucleus upon 
which the Islamic society necessary for this Islamic state would be built. 96  
According to Nasir Abas, the Uhud project was the direct result of the negative 
experience with Zulkarnaen in Ambon, who had failed to make an impact on Ambonese 
Muslim society.97 In order to reach out to the broader Muslim population in Poso and get their 
support, JI needed a programme and not just a military one: 
 
In Poso it [this programme] was 80 per cent da’i [preachers] and 20 per cent military 
guys—in Ambon it was all military. The da’i’s function was dakwah [Islamic outreach] 
and tarbiyah [Islamic education]. The mosques in Poso were empty because of the 
conflict. So we filled the mosques with our ustadz. They recruited from the people and 
sent them to Tanah Runtuh. That is how you get the support of the locals. That’s why 
we had influence in Poso but not in Ambon. And that is how we produced many radicals 
in Poso but not in Ambon.98 
 
In April 2001, Nasir Abas succeeded Abu Tholut as head of Mantiqi 3 following a markaziyah 
meeting in Solo where JI’s amir Abu Bakar Ba’asyir appointed him. This put Abas in a position 
where he could make plans for Poso, although as Abu Tholut emphasized, “there was no 
official decision to start using these areas to build a state. Those were private opinions—not 
from the markaziyah”. 99 Abas’ vision was to turn Poso into JI’s new economic area: 
 
I wanted to turn Poso into our new economic area. Because of the conflict, the price of 
land was cheap. Farmers were scared to farm and were selling. I wanted to buy up this 
cheap land with coffee and cocoa trees. We had lost Mantiqi 1 Singapore and Malaysia 
which was our economic mantiqi. We could turn Poso into our new economic area and 
help Muslims there as well. I surveyed the territory around Poso. It was perfect for a 
qoidah aminah [secure base]. It would be similar to Basilan for Abu Sayyaf. We could 
bring in weapons and set up weapons factories and supply other areas in Indonesia.100 
 
Abas believed that he would need approximately four years “to set this up and get our agro-
business running” after which JI “could start establishing an Islamic state with Poso’s Muslims 
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at its core”. 101 Abas had already worked out his plans, but these were shelved when he was 
arrested in April 2003. Nevertheless, JI’s closer relationship with Muslims in Poso outlasted 
the Poso jihad. At the same time, JI’s ability to learn from its mistakes in the Ambon conflict 
regarding the use of local jihad for their broader aims as well as leadership, training and strategy 
ensured JI’s resilience. 
 
Evolutionary Aspects from Ambon to Poso  
The Poso jihad also benefitted from the evolution of intra- and inter-mujahidin dynamics and 
the more general evolution of the “state of jihad” in Indonesia since the beginning of the Ambon 
jihad in February 1999. The Ambon jihad was characterized by competition within and 
between JI, Mujahidin KOMPAK and Laskar Jihad. This made devising an overall strategy 
difficult, and even resulted in armed clashes between jihadis. The tension among the mujahidin 
revolved around three issues. The first related to JI in Ambon whose members “were divided 
and made their own decisions”.102 Zulkarnaen’s inability to control his men resulted in JI 
members “joining other groups, especially KOMPAK as Aris Munandar paid them salaries”.103 
This was further exacerbated when Mantiqi 2 members were finally permitted to go to Ambon 
in mid-2000 as “they were subordinated to the Mantiqi 1 members already there and this caused 
command issues”.104 
The second concerned relations between the various Javanese mujahidin and local 
Ambonese mujahidin. Laskar Jihad, in particular, was not well received by many in the 
population as they “forced themselves upon the locals”.105 According to Ambonese Muslim 
leader Nasir Rahawarin, this was because “the Ambonese were shafi’i while Laskar Jihad was 
salafi” and because Laskar Jihad not only applied shari’a to its own but “wanted to apply it to 
everyone”. 106 When Laskar Jihad stoned to death one of its own members, Ambonese Muslims 
realized that “shafi’i and salafi don’t work together”.107 
  The third related to the rift that opened between Laskar Jihad and the other Javanese 
mujahidin, who were now being collectively referred to as Laskar Mujahidin by the local 
population.108 Laskar Jihad differed from JI, DI, NII and Mujahidin KOMPAK in that it did 
not have its roots in the 1948-62 Darul Islam rebellions in which mujahidin had fought both 
the Dutch and Indonesian republican forces with the aim of establishing an Islamic state in 
Indonesia.109 Instead, Laskar jihad came out of the Indonesian salafi movement which had 
emerged in the 1980s.110 This impacted on how it viewed politics and jihad. As a salafi 
organization, Laskar Jihad was apolitical, disapproved of political parties as divisive and did 
not permit rebellion against a Muslim government.111 It also defined jihad in “broad terms as 
the taking of whatever actions are necessary to improve one’s own faith” 112  as opposed to the 
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salafi-jihadis in JI who defined it in purely military terms as jihad-qital. All of these differences 
were clearly reflected in Laskar Jihad’s Ambon mission, which not just aimed at defending 
Ambon’s Muslims but also at fighting Christian separatism, spreading salafi Islam113 and 
building schools and hospitals.114 
  After the brief period of cautious cooperation following Laskar Jihad’s arrival in May 
2000, Laskar Jihad started labelling JI, DI, NII and Mujahidin KOMPAK as khawarij 
(rebels).115 As Aput recalled: 
 
They called us khawarij116 because we did not accept the state, political order and 
leadership. And they said that all those who did not side with them did not understand 
Islam. It was difficult with them. On the one hand, we were Muslim brothers, on the 
other, they did not treat us like that.117 
 
Inter-mujahidin relations were not helped by Laskar Jihad’s attitude and behaviour either. The 
other Javanese mujahidin were put off by Laskar Jihad’s “military style hierarchy”,118 Laskar 
Jihad’s insistence that “they were the elite”, and the constant bragging “about their relations 
with the [Indonesian] military”.119 This only confirmed suspicions among the mujahidin that 
Laskar Jihad was “working for [Indonesian] intelligence… to undermine us”.120  
In September 2001, after the more visible that Laskar Jihad had been repeatedly blamed 
for the attacks carried out by the others,121 Laskar Jihad and Mujahidin KOMPAK clashed 
openly in Kebon Cengkeh.122 Clashes also occurred in Ahuru. Indeed, antagonism had grown 
to such an extent that JI member Ali Fauzi, who was in Ambon during the Ahuru clash, “wanted 
to bomb the Laskar Jihad post in Kebun Cengkeh in response”.123  
As a result of these inter-mujahidin tensions, “there was no grand strategy in 
Ambon”.124 Many attacks had very little planning and were driven by revenge. As Abdullah 
Sunata explained: 
 
There were local triggers. For example, before we attacked Sirisori, Iha had been 
attacked by the Christians. …. Each case had a trigger. At Unpatti [University of 
Pattimura], there was a long history of discrimination against Muslim students and 
when the conflict erupted, Unpatti gave 100 per cent support to the Christians. The 
Muslim students were in an emergency campus near the hospital. That was the 
trigger.125 
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There was, however, a clear battle order. The average attack started with Muslim child fighters 
infiltrating the target area to set buildings on fire.126 The subsequent assault was led by those 
who had automatic firearms —Mujahidin KOMPAK, JI, DI or NII, sometimes supported by 
“pasukan siluman” (shadow forces) who were Muslim soldiers or police out of uniform.127 
Then came the local mujahidin with an array of homemade as well as traditional weapons, 
including machetes, bows and arrows, spears and fishing bombs.128   
The Poso jihad presented a much clearer strategic picture. By the time JI and Mujahidin 
KOMPAK went to Poso, the ambiguities in their relationship had been resolved. In 2000 they 
had started running separate training camps in Ambon after Mujahidin KOMPAK decided to 
open its doors to volunteers from all kinds of backgrounds earlier that year, although many of 
the trainers in the KOMPAK camps were still JI Afghan alumni. In Poso the separation was 
further underlined by the setting up of separate local affiliates. An equally clear, albeit hostile, 
boundary characterized the relationship between Laskar Jihad and the rest of the mujahidin. 
This ensured that unlike in Ambon, Laskar Jihad did not set up command posts in close 
proximity to the other mujahidin, thus reducing the possibility of clashes.  
Laskar Jihad, which again came several months after JI and KOMPAK, set up a string 
of village defences as it had done in Ambon. It also perfected the catapult bomb, “a catapult 
mechanism” they had developed “to launch homemade bombs into Christian areas” and which 
had been “quite effective”.129 As in Ambon, Laskar Jihad saw itself as protecting the unity and 
integrity of the Indonesian state, in this case convinced that Poso’s Christians were intent on 
establishing a separate state of Toraja Raya.130 However, unlike in Ambon, it did not have a 
radio station, so its strategy lacked the psychological warfare element. In this sense, Laskar 
Jihad made less of an impact in Poso than it had in Ambon and was thus a far less relevant 
jihadi force in Poso. Conversely, JI and Mujahidin KOMPAK became more relevant, organized 
and effective in Poso. They even adopted elements from Laskar Jihad’s territorial strategy in 
Ambon. As David McRae notes, the mujahidin sought to “simplify the ‘religious geography’ 
by removing settlements that lay between two villages inhabited by coreligionists”.131 Thus in 
2000-01, “each Christian border village was attacked, and two of the Christian strongholds— 
Sepe and Tangkura in Poso Pesisir sub-district—were also over-run”.132 Above all, however, 
they were able to think in broader strategic terms, including where the Poso jihad fit into their 
broader goals of establishing an Islamist counter-society in Indonesia and, ultimately, an 
Islamic state. 
 
Conclusion 
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The Ambon and Poso jihads occupy an important place in the evolution of jihadism in 
Indonesia as they were the first local jihads after the establishment of JI in 1993 and the end of 
President Suharto’s authoritarian New Order regime in May 1998. They provided JI and 
KOMPAK with relevance, a leadership role and training camps on Indonesian soil. They also 
became the testing ground for new or reframed Indonesian jihadi ideas and the skills and 
training acquired over the previous decade by Indonesians in Pakistan/Afghanistan and the 
southern Philippines. Being local jihads, Ambon and Poso enabled a far larger number of 
Indonesians to become involved and exposed to jihadi ideology, especially the idea of 
establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia. And last but certainly not least, the social bonding 
experienced during the training, in particular at the Waimurat camp, facilitated the formation 
of new networks which played a key role in subsequent Indonesian jihadi efforts in Aceh, 
Mindanao and Syria.  
At the same time, the Ambon and Poso jihads differed considerably in the amount of 
debate they engendered in JI, the approach to training and recruitment, and the degree of 
organization. The Ambon jihad bordered on anarchy and JI was pushed almost to the point of 
fracturing, while the Poso jihad was comparatively uncontentious and more organized. As this 
article has shown, this was largely the result of JI’s and Mujahidin KOMPAK’s ability to learn 
from the mistakes of the Ambon jihad. Thus they were able to provide clearer leadership, to 
embed the training of local volunteers in a broader recruitment process into local affiliate 
organizations, and to tie Poso ideologically into the wider Indonesian jihadi project. These 
corrections provided JI and Mujahidin KOMPAK with greater control and greater strategic 
direction in Poso. They also allowed JI to experiment with establishing an Islamic counter-
society as the nucleus of a future Islamic state. The importance of this learning process from 
Ambon to Poso for the evolution of Indonesian jihadism cannot be overstated. It not only 
allowed JI to approach the Poso jihad differently, but contributed to JI’s further development 
as an organization, ultimately strengthening its resilience. It prepared the ground for critical 
reflection in the Indonesian jihadi community after the 2002 Bali bombings133 as well as the 
2010 Aceh training camp debacle. And the continued ability to reflect and learn is evident in 
JI’s current focus on dakwah and tarbiyya (education) as well as in the shifting dynamics in 
Indonesia’s pro-ISIS generation today.  
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